NAME

SSL_get_client_random, SSL_get_server_random, SSL_SESSION_get_master_key, SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key - get internal TLS/SSL random values and get/set master key

SYNOPSIS

#include <openssl/ssl.h>

DESCRIPTION

SSL_get_client_random() extracts the random value sent from the client to the server during the initial SSL/TLS handshake. It copies as many bytes as it can of this value into the buffer provided in **out**, which must have at least **outlen** bytes available. It returns the total number of bytes that were actually copied. If **outlen** is zero, **SSL_get_client_random**() copies nothing, and returns the total size of the client_random value.

SSL_get_server_random() behaves the same, but extracts the random value sent from the server to the client during the initial SSL/TLS handshake.

SSL_SESSION_get_master_key() behaves the same, but extracts the master secret used to guarantee the security of the SSL/TLS session. This one can be dangerous if misused; see NOTES below.

SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key() sets the master key value associated with the SSL_SESSION sess. For example, this could be used to set up a session based PSK (see

SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)). The master key of length **len** should be provided at **in**. The supplied master key is copied by the function, so the caller is responsible for freeing and cleaning any memory associated with **in**. The caller must ensure that the length of the key is suitable for the ciphersuite associated with the SSL_SESSION.

NOTES

You probably shouldn't use these functions.

These functions expose internal values from the TLS handshake, for use in low-level protocols. You probably should not use them, unless you are implementing something that needs access to the internal protocol details.

Despite the names of **SSL_get_client_random**() and **SSL_get_server_random**(), they ARE NOT random number generators. Instead, they return the mostly-random values that were already generated and used in the TLS protocol. Using them in place of **RAND_bytes**() would be grossly foolish.

The security of your TLS session depends on keeping the master key secret: do not expose it, or any information about it, to anybody. If you need to calculate another secret value that depends on the master secret, you should probably use **SSL_export_keying_material()** instead, and forget that you ever saw these functions.

In current versions of the TLS protocols, the length of client_random (and also server_random) is always SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes. Support for other outlen arguments to the SSL_get_***_random**() functions is provided in case of the unlikely event that a future version or variant of TLS uses some other length there.

Finally, though the "client_random" and "server_random" values are called "random", many TLS implementations will generate four bytes of those values based on their view of the current time.

RETURN VALUES

SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.

For the other functions, if **outlen** is greater than 0 then these functions return the number of bytes actually copied, which will be less than or equal to **outlen**. If **outlen** is 0 then these functions return the maximum number of bytes they would copy -- that is, the length of the underlying field.

SEE ALSO

ssl(7), RAND_bytes(3), SSL_export_keying_material(3), SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)

COPYRIGHT

Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.